“I have already intimated to you the danger of Parties in the State, with particular reference to the founding of them on Geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you, in the most solemn manner, against the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party generally.

This Spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all Governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but, in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.

The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of Public Liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the Spirit of Party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise People to discourage and restrain it.

It serves always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeeble the Public Administration. It agitates the Community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another; foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the Government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the Administration of the Government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of Liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in Governments of a Monarchical cast, Patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of Party. But in those of the popular character, in Governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.”

— George Washington, Farewell Address 1796

How Foreign Governments Are Using Social Media to Influence America’s Social Safety Net Ecosystems — And What Pastors, Social Workers, Government Employees, Non-Profit Leaders, and Security Professionals Need to Know

Artificial intelligence has fundamentally changed the landscape of information warfare.

The era of foreign influence operations no longer depends upon thousands of human operatives sitting behind keyboards. Today, sophisticated AI systems can generate enormous volumes of persuasive text, realistic images, convincing videos, and coordinated social media engagement at a scale previously unimaginable.

The objective is often not to persuade everyone of one particular ideology. Instead, the objective is frequently to increase distrust, amplify division, weaken institutions, and reduce society’s ability to cooperate.

America’s social safety net—including churches, charities, nonprofits, schools, mental health organizations, civic groups, volunteer organizations, government agencies, and countless informal networks of neighbors helping neighbors—depends almost entirely upon trust.

Trust is therefore an attractive target.

Understanding how modern AI-enabled influence operations work has become an important responsibility for anyone serving in leadership over communities and vulnerable populations.

The New Battlefield: Trust

Researchers, intelligence agencies, and public investigations have documented foreign influence campaigns originating from countries including Russia, China, and Iran that attempt to manipulate online conversations through coordinated networks of fake accounts, state-affiliated media, and increasingly AI-assisted content.

These campaigns frequently seek to:

Increase political polarization
Encourage distrust of institutions
Amplify outrage
Reduce confidence in elections
Undermine media credibility
Inflame racial, religious, and ideological tensions
Create confusion rather than clarity

Importantly, these campaigns often promote multiple opposing viewpoints simultaneously.

The objective is not necessarily convincing citizens of one narrative.

The objective is making citizens lose confidence in every narrative.

When every institution appears corrupt, every leader appears compromised, and every source of information appears suspect, citizens become less able to cooperate and more vulnerable to manipulation.

Why Social Safety Net Institutions Matter

Healthy societies depend upon institutions that build trust between individuals.

Examples include:

Churches
Community nonprofits
Food banks
Counseling ministries
Volunteer organizations
Schools
Family support organizations
Local governments
Mental health providers
First responders

These organizations reduce isolation.

They encourage cooperation.

They solve problems locally before they become national crises.

They create relationships that cannot easily be replaced by technology or centralized bureaucracy.

If enough distrust develops around these organizations, fewer people volunteer, fewer people donate, fewer people seek help, and communities become increasingly fragmented.

Whether intentionally targeted or simply caught in broader influence campaigns, these institutions can become collateral damage in efforts to increase societal instability.

A society with weak community institutions is generally less resilient than one with strong, trusted networks of voluntary cooperation.

AI Makes Influence Operations Inexpensively Scalable

Large language models, image generators, synthetic voices, and automated scheduling tools dramatically reduce the cost of producing persuasive online content.

Instead of employing thousands of people, influence campaigns can increasingly rely upon AI-assisted systems capable of generating:

Thousands of comments
Highly realistic images
Personalized responses
Fake conversations
Artificial consensus
Coordinated emotional messaging
Deepfake videos
Synthetic audio

Rather than attempting to convince everyone of one position, AI allows adversaries to tailor messaging to countless audiences simultaneously, exploiting each community’s unique fears, frustrations, and existing divisions.

These technologies make it increasingly difficult for ordinary users to distinguish authentic grassroots discussion from manufactured engagement.

Real Examples

Several documented examples illustrate how foreign influence campaigns have evolved.

Russia’s Internet Research Agency became widely known for creating fake personas and social media pages that organized real-world events while simultaneously promoting opposing political viewpoints to maximize social conflict.

More recently, researchers have identified Chinese influence networks that attempt to shape international public opinion through large numbers of coordinated social media accounts, while Iranian operations have similarly used networks of fabricated online personas to influence discussions surrounding geopolitical events.

Since the emergence of generative AI, cybersecurity researchers have also documented campaigns using AI-generated profile images, automated text generation, and synthetic media to increase both the scale and apparent authenticity of influence operations.

While not every suspicious account is part of a foreign campaign, these documented operations demonstrate that such tactics are real, increasingly sophisticated, and continually evolving.

Groupthink as a Force Multiplier

Human beings naturally look to others when forming opinions.

Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as social proof.

When individuals repeatedly observe what appears to be overwhelming agreement, many begin adjusting their own beliefs accordingly—even when the apparent consensus is artificial.

AI systems dramatically increase the ability to manufacture this perception.

Thousands of coordinated accounts can create the illusion that:

“Everyone believes this.”
“Everyone is leaving.”
“Everyone is angry.”
“Everyone has lost trust.”
“Everyone is against this institution.”

If enough people believe they are alone, they often become silent.

Silence then creates the appearance of consensus.

This feedback loop has historically contributed to periods of rapid social upheaval.

Foreign influence operations need not manufacture every opinion. They need only amplify existing disagreements until they appear universal, inevitable, and irreversible.

Ideological Context

Throughout history, revolutionary political movements have often sought to weaken competing sources of authority and loyalty before attempting broader societal transformation.

Karl Marx argued that existing social and economic structures would ultimately be replaced through revolutionary transformation toward collective ownership of the means of production. In practice, many governments that later adopted Marxist-Leninist systems centralized significant authority over industry, education, media, religious institutions, labor organizations, and social welfare, reducing the influence of independent organizations that could compete with the authority of the state.

The broader historical lesson extends beyond any single ideology. Independent institutions—including churches, charities, civic organizations, families, and local nonprofits—represent decentralized sources of trust, identity, and mutual aid. They distribute influence across society rather than concentrating it within a single authority.

Foreign influence operations do not necessarily seek to persuade Americans to embrace Marxism, capitalism, or any particular political philosophy. Instead, they often benefit whenever Americans lose confidence in the institutions that hold communities together. By amplifying narratives that portray every church as corrupt, every nonprofit as self-serving, every public servant as incompetent, or every civic organization as compromised, adversaries can weaken social cohesion regardless of which ideology ultimately gains ground.

Whether the end goal is geopolitical advantage, domestic instability, or diminished American influence abroad, eroding trust in independent community institutions serves the broader objective of making society less resilient.

Warning Signs of Possible Coordinated Influence

No single indicator proves that an account is part of a foreign influence operation.

However, combinations of these characteristics may justify additional scrutiny:

Profile images that appear AI-generated or inconsistent.
Few genuine personal photographs.
Faces rarely or never shown.
Highly emotional posting patterns.
Extremely high posting frequency.
Little evidence of authentic offline life.
Generic biographies.
Sudden changes in account focus.
Repetitive messaging across multiple accounts.
Engagement that appears unusually synchronized.
Content designed primarily to provoke outrage rather than inform.
Heavy reliance on emotionally loaded language.
Videos showing signs of synthetic audio or visual artifacts.
Inconsistent lip synchronization or unnatural facial movements.
Claims that cannot be verified through reputable sources.
Attempts to isolate followers from all traditional sources of information.
Persistent framing that every institution is irredeemably corrupt or untrustworthy.
Recommendation algorithms suddenly introducing large volumes of inflammatory content from accounts you have never intentionally followed.
Networks of accounts that appear to reinforce one another while revealing little verifiable information about who operates them.

These indicators are not proof of malicious intent. Legitimate creators may share some of these characteristics. They are best viewed as reasons for careful evaluation rather than conclusions.

Recommendations for Leaders

Pastors, nonprofit executives, social workers, government employees, educators, and security professionals can reduce vulnerability by:

Verifying important claims through multiple credible sources.
Encouraging thoughtful disagreement rather than emotional reaction.
Teaching digital literacy and AI literacy.
Establishing clear internal communication channels during crises.
Avoiding major organizational decisions based solely on social media sentiment.
Training staff to recognize manipulated media.
Promoting face-to-face community relationships that cannot be easily replicated online.
Reporting coordinated inauthentic behavior to platform operators when appropriate.
Recognizing that online outrage is not necessarily representative of public opinion.
Building resilient organizations that measure success by mission effectiveness rather than algorithmic approval.

Strong communities remain one of the most effective defenses against influence operations.

America’s Invisible Front Line

Artificial intelligence has not changed human nature.

It has changed the speed, scale, and sophistication with which human psychology can be influenced.

Foreign influence campaigns are most effective where trust is already fragile and institutions are already under strain.

America’s churches, nonprofits, government agencies, schools, community organizations, and civic leaders should not assume they are immune simply because their missions are charitable or nonpolitical.

The strength of American society has long rested not solely in its military or economy, but in its decentralized network of families, faith communities, charitable organizations, civic associations, first responders, educators, and public servants who solve problems together long before they become national crises. These institutions are more than service providers—they are generators of trust, resilience, and social cohesion.

In many respects, they represent America’s invisible front line.

Their work strengthens communities, reduces isolation, and builds the relationships that hostile actors seek to fracture through manipulation and manufactured distrust.

Resilience begins with discernment: evaluating information carefully, resisting manufactured outrage, strengthening real-world relationships, and recognizing that not every online consensus reflects authentic public opinion.

As artificial intelligence continues to transform information warfare, protecting America’s social fabric will require more than cybersecurity. It will require leaders who understand that trust itself has become critical infrastructure.

The most effective defense against AI-powered psychological operations is not fear, censorship, or panic. It is resilient communities, informed citizens, strong local institutions, and leaders committed to truth, humility, and genuine human connection.

The future of America’s social resilience may depend less on what happens online than on the strength of the communities we continue to build offline.